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Abstract
Deep Neural Network (DNN) attacks have mostly been conducted through ad-
versarial input example generation. Recent work on adversarial attack of DNN
weights, especially, Bit-Flip based adversarial weight Attack (BFA) has proved to
be very powerful. BFA is an un-targeted attack that can classify all inputs into a
random output class by flipping a very small number of weight bits stored in com-
puter memory. This paper presents the first work on targeted adversarial weight
attack for quantized DNN models. Specifically, we propose Targeted variants of
BFA (T-BFA), which can intentionally mislead selected inputs to a target output
class. The objective is achieved by identifying the weight bits that are highly asso-
ciated with the classification of a targeted output through a novel class-dependant
weight bit ranking algorithm. T-BFA performance has been successfully demon-
strated on multiple network architectures for the image classification task. For
example, by merely flipping 27 (out of 88 million) weight bits, T-BFA can mis-
classify all the images in Ibex class into Proboscis Monkey class (i.e., 100% attack
success rate) on ImageNet dataset, while maintaining 59.35% validation accuracy
on ResNet-18.
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved tremendous success in
a wide variety of applications, including image classification [1, 2], speech recogni-
tion [3, 4] and machine translation [5, 6]. Unfortunately, DNN models are not secure
and the vulnerability of DNN models has been exposed by [7, 8] in their works on
adversarial input example generation.
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Recently, adversarial weight attacks have been added to the the security challenge
of DNN models. Memory fault injection techniques, e.g., Laser Beam Attack [9] and
Row-Hammer Attack (RHA) [10, 11], can inject faults into a computer main mem-
ory (i.e., DRAM). In comparison to adversarial input attacks that require designing
noise to be injected into each input separately, an adversarial weight attack requires
modifying the model only once to achieve the desired attack output for the whole in-
put set. As shown in Fig. 1, the DNN weights stored in the main memory can be
modified by advanced memory bit attack algorithms [12, 13, 14] to degrade DNN per-
formance. Further, advanced computer side-channel attacks [15, 16] have successfully
demonstrated that a malicious attacker can extract DNN parameters and launch an ad-
versarial weight attack. Several adversarial weight attacks have been proposed in recent
years [13, 12, 14, 17]. Among them, the memory bit-flip based adversarial un-targeted
weight attack in [14] is the strongest. It has been proven to degrade a fully-functional
ResNet-18 test accuracy on the ImageNet dataset to 0.1% with only 13 bit-flips (out of
93 million bits).
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Figure 1: Demonstration of Row-Hammer Attack (RHA) on the identified vulnerable
bits with three distinct types of targeted attack objective proposed in T-BFA.
Existing un-targeted bit-flip based adversarial weight attacks reduce the overall pre-
diction accuracy of a DNN model. Targeted attacks [18, 19] pose an even greater threat
for the following reasons: First, it gives the attacker precise control on the malicious
objective and behavior. Second, a carefully crafted targeted attack objective can cause
a devastating effect on the DNN output. For example, for self-driving car applications,
targeting a stop sign to be miss-classified to a high-speed limit sign while keeping the
accuracy of all other signs intact can cause very serious damage.
All the existing targeted attacks in the adversarial weight attack domain either fail
to perform the attack effectively i.e., requiring a large number of weight modifica-
tions [20], or are evaluated on a full-precision DNN [13, 12]. A DNN with full pre-
cision weights is easier to attack; it can be made to malfunction by just flipping the
exponent bits compared to quantized DNN weights which naturally noise resilient.
However, weight quantization is becoming a must-optimization for optimal efficiency
in most computing platforms, such as Google’s TPU [21].
In this work, we propose Targeted Bit-Flip Attack (T-BFA), the first work on tar-
geted adversarial weight attack of weight-quantized DNNs. We consider three vari-
ants of T-BFA as shown in the right panel of Fig. 1: N-to-1 where inputs from N
2
source classes are mapped to 1 target class, 1-to-1 where inputs from 1 source class are
mapped to 1 target class, and 1-to-1 (stealthy) where not only are inputs from 1 source
class mapped to 1 target class but also the accuracy of the other class classifications
are kept unchanged as much as possible. The 1-to-1 stealthy attack is particularly vi-
cious since DNN users may not aware that an attacker has hijacked the network. The
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Our proposed T-BFA can break the noise resilience of a quantized DNN through N-
to-1 (I), 1-to-1 (II), and 1-to-1 stealthy (III) adversarial weight attacks by flipping a
very small number of weight bits stored in computer memory.
• To achieve the desired targeted attack objective, we formulate three distinct loss
functions associated with each type of attack. We propose a novel iterative searching
algorithm that can successfully minimize these loss functions to locate vulnerable
weight bits that are associated with a target class.
• We evaluate T-BFA on a wide range of network architectures (e.g., ResNet, VGG
and MobileNet-V2) for image classification using CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets.
The experiments on ResNet-18 [22] using ImageNet dataset show that our proposed
T-BFA can achieve 100% attack success rate in miss-classifying all images in the
‘Ibex’ class into ‘Proboscis Monkey’ class with only 27 bit-flips while keeping the
test accuracy for other class images at 59.35%.
• Finally, we present an analysis of three T-BFA schemes on different DNN architec-
tures with varying capacities and quantization levels. Such analysis provides key
insights in deriving effective defense strategies against T-BFA attacks.
2 Background and Related Work
Bit-Flip Attack. The recent developments in memory fault injection attacks [10, 23]
have made it feasible to conduct an adversarial weight attack for a DNN model running
on a computer. Among them, a row-hammer attack [10] on Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) is the most popular one since it can create a profile of memory bits
stored inside the main memory (i.e., DRAM) and flip any bit of a given target address.
The first few works that exploited row-hammer to attack DNN weights flipped the Most
Significant Bits (MSB bits) of DNN parameters, such as the bias [12] or weight [13],
and changed them to a significantly large value, thus degrading accuracy. However,
those attacks were only evaluated on a model with full precision (i.e. floating point)
parameters and failed in DNNs with quantized parameters.
A major milestone in adversarial weight attack is the work in [14] which imple-
mented a stronger version of a bit-flip attack on an 8-bit fixed-point quantized network.
In this work [14], BFA searches for the weight bits iteratively to gradually decrease
DNN accuracy. However, the BFA design in [14] is for an un-targeted attack. Even
though it succeeds in hampering the overall test accuracy, it fails to degrade the accu-
racy of a targeted class.
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Targeted Attack. A targeted attack has more precise control on the miss-classification
behavior and can cause higher calamity. It is a well-investigated technique in adversar-
ial input attack domain [19, 18, 7]. Here the attacker finds additive noise that decreases
the loss function w.r.t a false target label for each image separately. Another form of
targeted attack is the Trojan attack [24, 25]. Inserting a Trojan requires modifying the
weights through re-training of the network and the attacker’s access to the training facil-
ity (e.g., supply chain). Even though recently developed targeted bit Trojan attack [26]
can inject Trojans into DNN during run-time using only 84 bit-flips, it still requires the
help of an input trigger. Apart from Trojan attacks, recent adversarial model parameter
attacks can also perform a targeted attack without requiring a trigger [20, 12]. Again,
some of them [20] require a larger value of L0 norm (i.e., 900) for weight perturbation.
Also, these attacks [20, 12] have been evaluated on a full-precision model which has
been reported in [13, 14] of being easier to attack.
Threat Model. In this work, we follow the standard white-box attack threat model
assumption similar to the previous bit-flip based adversarial weight attacks [14, 26].
Our threat model assumes that the attacker has access to model weights, gradients
and a portion of test data to perform the attack. Such an assumption is valid since
previous works have demonstrated an attacker can effectively steal similar information
(i.e., layer number, weight size, and parameters) through side-channel attacks [15, 16].
Finally, we assume that the attacker is denied access to any form of training information
(i.e., training dataset, hyper-parameters) to conduct the attack.
3 Targeted Bit-Flip Adversarial Weight Attack
3.1 Overview of proposed T-BFA Variants
We propose Targeted Bit-Flip adversarial weight Attack (T-BFA) that results in mis-
classification of inputs from their source category/categories (i.e., ground-truth) to the
target category, via a small number of malicious bit-flips on the quantized weight-bits
of pre-trained DNN models. As depicted in Fig. 1, we propose three types of T-BFA
with varying input constraints (e.g., number of source categories to be considered),
which are elaborated as follows:
• Type-I: N-to-1 Attack. Given that the input data belongs to one of N -classes, the
attack objective of this T-BFA variant is to force the entire dataset X = {Xi}Ni=1
with all N classes (as source classes) to one adversary-selected target class. The
objective function used in conventional model training is converted to the T-BFA
malicious one (LHS and RHS in Eq. (1) respectively) and expressed as follows:
min
{W}
EXL(f(x, {W}); t) T-BFA−−−→ min LN-to-1 = min{B} EXL(f(x, {B}); tq) (1)
where {W} is the weight tensor set of the DNN model and {B} is its quantized
counterpart (i.e., weight-bit tensor set). Given vectorized input x ∈ X, f(x, {W})
computes the DNN inference output. L(·; ·) denote the cross-entropy loss between
DNN inference output and labels. x and t are input data and its corresponding
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ground-truth label. For this attack, the ground-truth label term of source category1
t ∈ e(i), i ∈ {1, ..., N} is tampered to the selected q-indexed target category tq ∈
e(q).
• Type-II: 1-to-1 Attack. In this T-BFA variant, the adversary focuses on the mis-
classification of input dataXp of single p-indexed source category into the q-indexed
target category (p 6= q), without caring about the impact on the remaining categories
Xi 6=p. It can be described as:
min L1-to-1 = min{B} EXpL(f(xp, {B}); tq); xp ∈ Xp (2)
• Type-III: 1-to-1 Stealthy Attack. In addition to the type-II 1-to-1 attack described
above, the stealth version has two objectives: 1) All the input data from p-indexed
categoryXp are classified into q-indexed target category which is the same as Eq. (2);
2) Maintaining correct predictions of the data excluded from source categoryXj , j ∈
{1, 2, .., N}\{p}. These two objectives can be achieved via the optimization of the
two corresponding loss terms in the RHS of the following objective function:
min L1-to-1(S) = min{B} EX
(
L(f(x, {B}); tq)·1x∈Xp+L(f(x, {B}); t)·1x∈Xj
)
(3)
where 1condition returns 1 if the condition is true, 0 otherwise.
In general, the three T-BFA variants mainly show the attack objective in terms of
source and target categories. Another critical optimization constraint is using limited
number of malicious bit-flips on weight bits to achieve the objectives in Eqs. (1) to (3).
This could be viewed as a joint-optimization andrepresented by:
min LT-BFA, LT-BFA ∈ {LN-to-1,L1-to-1,L1-to-1(S)}; s.t. min{B} Dhd({Bˆ}, {B}); (4)
where Dhd is the Hamming-distance between the weight-bit tensors prior to ({Bˆ}) and
after ({B}) the attack. Instead of applying Dhd as an additional loss term in Eqs. (1)
to (3) to form single multi-objective function, we follow the optimization flow adopted
by the un-targeted BFA [14], with several T-BFA-specific modifications; the details are
given in the following subsection.
3.2 Optimization of T-BFA Variants
The optimization of T-BFA can be generally described as an iterative process, wherein
each iteration, only single weight-bit is identified followed by the malicious bit-flip.
In the k-th iteration of T-BFA optimization, the objective function in Eq. (4) can be
rewritten as:
min
{Bk}
LT-BFA; s.t. Dhd({Bk}, {Bk−1}) = 1 (5)
where the single bit-flip is highlighted by defining inter-iteration Hamming distance
Dhd as 1. To minimize LT-BFA with single bit-flips per iteration, we inherit and modify
1e(i) is the notation of one-hot code vector [0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0] with a 1 at position i.
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the intra- and inter-layer bit search method proposed in the un-targeted BFA scheme [14].
Given a DNN model with L layers (e.g., convolution layers), the intra-layer bit search
is to identify one weight-bit per layer and traverse through all L layers, thus returning
L weight-bit candidates. Then, the following inter-layer search finds one weight-bit
out of L weight-bit candidates brought up by the intra-layer search. We describe the
intra- and inter-layer search in iteration-k in the following paragraphs.
Intra-layer Bit Search. For layer indexed by l, the intra-layer bit search is to identify
weight-bit candidate w.r.t two criteria: 1) identifying the bit with the higest gradient;
2) can be (possibly) flipped along the direction of bit-gradient2. These two criteria can
be mathematically described as:
argmax
Mkl ,b
k
l
|∇Bk−1l L
k
T-BFA|; s.t. bkl = clamp
(
bk−1l − sign(∇bk−1l L
k
T-BFA)
)
, bkl 6= bk−1l
(6)
where Mkl is the mask that indicates the location of the identified bit within weight-bit
tensor Bk−1l and its value bkl ∈ {0, 1}. clamp(·) is the clamping function with 0 and
1 as lower and upper bound. The intra-layer bit search traverses through all the layers
to generate the weight-bit candidate set, {Mkl }Ll=1. Meanwhile, for each weight-bit
candidate in {Mkl }Ll=1, the corresponding T-BFA loss is profiled {LkT-BFA,l}Ll=1 after the
identified weight-bit has been flipped.
Inter-layer Bit Search. Based on the intra-layer search outcomes (i.e., {Mkl }Ll=1),
the inter-layer search performs straight-forward comparison to identify the weight-bit
candidate with minimum profiled loss as the weight-bit to attack in iteration-k. This
process can be expressed as follows:
argmin {LkT-BFA,l}Ll=1 (7)
By applying above optimization method, we can successfully achieve the objective
specified in Eq. (4).
4 Experimental Setup
Dataset configuration for attack. In this work, we evaluate our attacks on two vision
datasets: CIFAR-10 [1] and ImageNet [27]. In Table 1, we provide an overview of data
division to conduct each type of attack. To conduct an N-to-1 attack on CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet, we randomly choose a test batch from the test dataset. However, to evaluate
1-to-1 or 1-to-1(S) attack, we require a subset of source class (tp) test images. Since
the CIFAR-10 dataset has 1k images in each class, we use 500 images to perform the
attack and the remaining 500 images for evaluating the Attack Success Rate (ASR).
Since the ImageNet dataset has only 50 images per class, we conduct the attack using
25 images from the source class and use the remaining 25 images for evaluating ASR.
2In the intra-layer search of un-targeted BFA [14], the weight-bit can be flipped along the opposite direc-
tion of bit-gradient, as it performs maximization (instead of minimization used in this work).
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Furthermore, for ImageNet, we always evaluate test accuracy on the whole test dataset
of 50k images because the amount of test data used to perform the attack (e.g., 50)
is negligible compared to 50k test images. The mean and standard deviation numbers
are calculated over 5 trial runs for CIFAR-10 and 3 trial runs for ImageNet. Also, we
terminate attacks when the ASR reaches higher than 99.99% or does not change for
three successive iterations.
Table 1: Test data splitting to conduct targeted attack from source class tp to target class
tq. CIFAR-10 data has 10k test images with each class containing 1000 test images and
the ImageNet dataset has 50k test samples with each class containing 50 images. Note:
(tr) means images belong to any other class apart from the source class.
Metrics
# of Data to
conduct attack
# of Data to
evaluate ASR
# of Data to
evaluate Test acc.
# of Data to
conduct attack
# of Data to
evaluate ASR
# of Data to
evaluate Test acc.
Dataset CIFAR-10 ImageNet
N-to-1 128 10k 10k 50 50k 50k
1-to-1 500( tp ) 500(tp) 9k 25(tp) 25(tp) 50k
1-to-1 (S) 500(tp)+500(tr) 500(tp) 8.5k 25(tp)+25 (tr) 25(tp) 50k
Evaluation Metrics Two metrics are used in this work for attack evaluation: Post-
attack accuracy, which is the inference accuracy on test subset, and Attack Success
Rate (ASR) defined by the percentage of source class images correctly classified into
target class via T-BFA.
Table 2: N-to-1 Attack: number of bit-flips (mean±std) required to classify all the input
images to a corresponding target class with 100% ASR. In each case, test accuracy
drops to 10%.
Class 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Average
ResNet-20 4.0 ± 0 4.6 ± 0.9 5.0 ± 2.2 6.2 ± 2.3 4.6 ± 0.9 5.2 ± 1.6 6.8 ± 1.9 4.4 ± 1.7 5 ± 2.2 4.8 ± 1.8 5.1
VGG-11 3.0 ± 0.0 3.0 ± 0.0 3.0 ± 0.0 3.0 ± 0.0 2.8 ± 0.4 2.0 ± 0.0 3.0 ± 0.0 3.2 ± 0.4 3.0 ± 0.0 3.0 ± 0.0 3.0
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91.9 57.3 47.8 30.8 40.8 57.7 65.2 42.8 42.8 50.4
75.0 91.9 66.1 71.2 42.3 75.7 67.8 55.4 76.1 76.1
30.7 25.9 91.9 39.4 41.7 39.4 30.4 39.4 26.3 27.3
19.4 34.5 39.0 91.9 31.5 35.5 38.1 40.4 32.4 34.9
42.6 30.5 48.2 39.1 91.9 37.0 46.6 48.4 37.8 40.6
43.1 32.4 65.1 54.4 36.6 91.9 44.9 61.8 33.4 30.2
69.7 48.5 68.2 70.0 63.4 68.9 91.9 44.1 44.5 53.6
65.6 41.1 60.5 67.2 53.4 37.6 40.1 91.9 53.0 48.9
74.6 42.7 49.0 36.4 36.1 52.1 38.0 38.2 91.9 65.1
28.9 45.6 41.1 27.7 40.5 29.5 22.7 44.0 11.6 91.9
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Figure 2: Type II: 1-to-1 attack on ResNet-20 between source class and target class.
The left subplot shows post attack test accuracy and the right subplot shows average
number of bit-flips required for the attack.
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Figure 3: Type III: 1-to-1 (S) attack post attack test accuracy, attack success rate and
avg. # of bit-flips for five rounds of attacks for both Resnet-20 and VGG-11 Networks.
5 Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of our T-BFA attack against all three
versions of targeted attack on both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets.
5.1 CIFAR-10 Results
N-to-1 Attack. For CIFAR-10, the proposed N-to-1 attack can successfully reach
100% ASR for both VGG-11 and ResNet-20 architectures on each target class. As
shown in Table 2, the range of average bit-flips required to achieve 100% ASR is be-
tween 4 ∼ 6.8 and 2.8 ∼ 3 for ResNet-20 and VGG-11, respectively. So for the N-to-1
attack, VGG-11 requires a consistently fewer number of bit-flips than ResNet-20 for
all the CIFAR-10 classes.
Take-Away 1. Our analysis of the N-to-1 attack shows that there is no particular target
class that is easier or more difficult to attack. Thus we conclude that the input feature
patterns play a small role in resisting the attack, while the network architecture plays a
more important role.
1-to-1 Attack. In this version of T-BFA, the attacker performs 1-to-1 miss-classification
with fewer number of bit-flips (see Fig. 2) in comparison to the N-to-1 version (see Ta-
ble 2). For most of the entries shown in Fig. 2, the 1-to-1 attack requires only 1-2
bit-flips to achieve 100%ASR with a few exceptions. Overall, for all possible combi-
nations of classes, T-BFA successfully achieves 100% 1-to-1 miss-classification with a
range of 1 ∼ 7.4 bit-flips.
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Take-Away 2. 1-to-1 attack requires, in general, less bit-flips compared to N-to-1
attack. This is expected since mis-classifying all N classes are more difficult than mis-
classifying just one class.
1-to-1 Stealthy (S) Attack.
Our evaluation of 8-bit quantized ResNet-20 and VGG-11 models show a 91.9%
and 91.6% baseline CIFAR-10 test accuracy, respectively. As shown in Fig. 3, after
the attack, the accuracy drops for both networks with ResNet-20 seeing a larger drop
in accuracy. The average test accuracy after five rounds of attack is between 31.3 ∼
88.3% for ResNet-20. On the other hand, VGG-11 maintains a better test accuracy
with a range of 48.3 ∼ 90.1%.
Our proposed T-BFA is effective in attacking ResNet-20 network by achieving ASR
higher than 97% for all combinations of source and target classes. However, VGG-11
shows slightly better resistance to the attack with an ASR range of 93-99% for different
combinations. This is consistent with prior work which shows that dense networks
(i.e., VGG-11, VGG-16) are resistant to both adversarial weight attack [26] and input
attack [7]. While for both networks, some classes are more vulnerable to bit-flip attack
than others, most source class and target class combinations require less than 10 bit-
flips to conduct the 1-to-1 stealthy attack.
Take-Away 3. A compact network, like ResNet-20 with 0.27M parameters, has less
capacity to learn the dual objective function in 1-to-1 (S) attack through a small number
of bit-flips in comparison to denser network, like VGG-11 with 132M parameters. As
a result, the test accuracy drop for a compact network, like ResNet-20, is higher.
Table 3: Performance of T-BFA variants on ImageNet (from Ibex class to Proboscis
Monkey class). The original test accuracies of ResNet-18, ResNet-34 and MobileNet-
V2 are 69.23%, 75.5% and 72.01%, respectively.
Type
Attack
Success
Rate (%)
Test
Accuracy
(%)
# of
Bit-Flips
Attack
Success
Rate (%)
Test
Accuracy
(%)
# of
Bit-Flips
Attack
Success
Rate (%)
Test
Accuracy
(%)
# of
Bit-Flips
N-to-1 99.78 ± 0.27 0.23 ± 0.18 32.6 ± 8.2 99.99 ± 0 0.1 ± 0 21 ± 4 100 ±0 0.1 ± 0 17.3 ± 3.29
1-to-1 100 ± 0 32.13 ± 14.4 16.7 ± 1.24 100 ± 0 23.74 ± 1.71 9.33 ± 0.94 100 ± 0 1.19 ± 0.22 13 ±1.41
1-to-1 (S) 100 ± 0 59.48 ± 2.9 27.3 ± 16.7 100 ± 0 58.33 ± 3.29 40.33 ± 30.32 98.67 ± 1.89 33.99 ± 4.93 45.33 ± 21.74
ResNet-18 (# of parameters: 11M) ResNet-34 (# of parameters: 21M) MobileNet-V2 (# of parameters: 2.1M)
5.2 ImageNet Results
ImageNet dataset has a much larger number of output classes compared to CIFAR-10.
We do not have the space to report all targeted attack results, thus we randomly pick
one combination of target attack (Ibex class -¿ Proboscis Monkey class) to show our
method’s efficiency. For N-to-1 attack, Table 3 shows that our method requires 32, 21
and 17.3 bit-flips, on average, for ResNet-18, ResNet-34 and MobileNet-V2, respec-
tively. Thus a more compact network is more vulnerable to an N-to-1 attack. Now
for 1-to-1 (S) attack, a compact network e.g., MobileNet-V2 (with 2.1M parameters)
fails to maintain a reasonable test accuracy (i.e., 33.9%), while larger networks such
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as ResNet-18 and ResNet-34 help to maintain a reasonable test accuracy (i.e., ¿59%)
while achieving 100% ASR.
Take-Away 4. In the case of the ImageNet dataset, a large number of output classes
increase the attack difficulty for T-BFA. However, consistent with CIFAR-10 obser-
vations, it is easier to conduct a 1-to-1 (S) attack on a network with higher capacity
due to its larger optimization space that helps achieve dual objectives of maintaining
reasonable test accuracy as well as achieving very high ASR.
Table 4: Comparison with Competing Methods We directly report the numbers from
the respective papers for [12, 20]. For [26, 14] we run the attack on ResNet-20 8-bit
quantized network.
Method
# of Images
Attacked
Attack
Success
Rate (%)
Test Accuracy
(%)
# of
Bit-Flips
Model
Precision
Untargeted-BFA (I) [14] 10k - 10.27 28 8-bit
Proposed N-to-1(I) 10k 100 10 4 8-bit
SBA (II) [12] 100 100 60.0 1 full-precision
Proposed 1-to-1 (II) 1000 100 10 3.2 8-bit
TBT (III) [26] 10k 93.89 82.03 199 8-bit
GDA (III) [12] 100 100 81.66 198 full-precision
Fault Sneaking (III) [20] 16 100 76.4 >2565 full-precision
Proposed 1-to-1 (s) III 1000 99.3 88.3 12.2 8-bit
5.3 Comparison with Other Competing Methods
Several existing targeted attacks [14, 26, 12, 20] in adversarial weight attack domain
have a similar goal to our proposed targeted attack. For instance, both un-targeted
progressive BFA and the proposed N-to-1 T-BFA attack try to achieve a test accuracy
of 10 % after an attack.
As shown in Table 4, the proposed N-to-1 targeted attack achieves the same ob-
jective as [14] with 7× less number of bit-flips. Other stronger versions of previous
targeted attacks such as GDA [12] and fault sneaking attacks [20] have shown supe-
rior results (100% ASR) against a weaker threat model (i.e., full-precision model or
attacking only 100 images). However, the proposed T-BFA 1-to-1 (s) outperforms both
[12],[20] on a quantized network with 16× and 210× fewer number of bit-flips. In
the family of Neural Trojan works [25, 24, 26], Targeted Bit Trojan (TBT) follows a
more strict threat model and performs the attack with the least number of bit-flips. Our
1-to-1 (s) proves to be much more effective than TBT; it achieves a higher test accuracy
and higher ASR with 16× fewer bit-flips.
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6 Discussion
Effect of Network width and precision. We perform two ablation studies to analyze
the effects of model compression and network capacity. In Table 5, we show the results
of our attack for quantized networks with weights represented by 2,4,6,8 bits. The
performance of N-to-1 and 1-to-1 attack is slightly weaker for a low bit-width network
(e.g., 2-bit). This is expected since low bit-width networks are reported to be more
resilient to small perturbations. The 2 bit-width network is also resilient to a 1-to-1
(s) attack. A preliminary study of network width indicated that increasing network
channel width (×2) helped recover the test accuracy from 64.0% to 89.01 % for 1-to-1
(S) attack. Such observations motivated us to explore possible future defense methods
against T-BFA:
Table 5: Result of varying the quantization bit-width on ResNet-20. For this ablation
study, we chose to attack from class 0 to class 9 only. TA is Test accuracy before the
attack.
Type
Attack
Success
Rate (%)
Test
Accuracy
(%)
# of
Bit-Flips
Attack
Success
Rate (%)
Test
Accuracy
(%)
# of
Bit-Flips
8-Bit ( TA: 92.91%) 6-Bit ( TA: 92.41%)
N-to-1 (I) 100 ± 0 10 ± 0 6.0 ± 2.2 100 ± 0 10 ± 0 6.2 ± 0.83
1-to-1 (II) 100 ± 0 68.45 ± 0.08 2.2 ± 0 100 ± 0 68.45 ± 0.08 2 ± 0
1-to-1 (S) (III) 99.7 ± 0 80.3 ± 0 4.4 ± 0.54 100 ± 0 68.53 ± 0.15 1.6 ± 0.54
4-Bit (TA: 91.33%) 2-Bit (TA: 90.3%)
N-to-1 (I) 100 ± 0 10 ± 0 4.4 ± 0.55 100 ± 0 10 ± 0 37.6 ± 0.9
1-to-1 (II) 100 ± 0 11.54 ± 0.08 4 ± 0 100 ± 0 76.43 ± 3.43 17.6 ± 1.7
1-to-1 (S) (III) 98.56 ± 0.7 12.79 ± 1.88 16.4 ± 9.36 97.87 ± 1.75 84.6 ± 0.91 19.6 ± 6.6
Defense Strategy 1. A network with higher model capacity (e.g., ResNet-34 or in-
creased width) or lower quantization bit-resolution (e.g., 2 bit), resists N-to-1 attack
better. As a result, a possible defense strategy against the N-to-1 attack would be to
increase model capacity, network width, or to decrease the quantization level.
Defense Strategy 2. It is difficult to achieve dual objectives of ensuring both high
ASR and test accuracy after a 1-to-1 (s) attack on a compact network (e.g., MobileNet-
V2). Thus for 1-to-1 (s) attack, decreasing the network capacity will limit the attacker’s
ability to hide the attack (by failing to maintain the test accuracy on other classes),
thereby helping to detect this attack..
Layer-wise analysis of bit-flips and critical weights. We observe that the most vul-
nerable layer for the T-BFA attack is the last classification layer. In the case of 1-to-1
(s) attack, 100 % of the bit-flips are in the last layer for both ResNet-20 and VGG-11
models. For the N-to-1 attack, more than 90% bit-flips are in the last classification
layer. Further, to miss-classify from one source class to another target class, we see
that the attack always picks one particular weight in the last layer even after running
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the attack with different test batches. We call this weight as critical weight in classify-
ing images from source class tp to target class tq . In the following Table 6, we list the
critical weights for classifying all the class 1 images to different classes on ResNet-20:
Table 6: If the last layer weight matrix Wm×n is flattened to create a 1-D array of size
1×mn, then T-BFA picks the weights with the following indices in the flattened 1-D
array.
Target Class 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Index value 41 169 233 297 325 425 489 553 625
Connected output neuron 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
This study leads to the question: Can we defend T-BFA by securing the critical
weights in the last layer? To answer the question, we run a T-BFA attack by first secur-
ing the critical weights which cannot be flipped. Then, for more aggressive protection,
we even secure the entire last layer. This is motivated by prior work that secures the
entire last layer in a protected enclave, such as Intel SGX [28], as an effective privacy
protection method. Unfortunately, for both cases, all three versions of T-BFA still suc-
ceed but requiring more number of bit flips. For example, for CIFAR10, to misclassify
image from class 1 to class 2, if the critical weights are secured, then we require 2×
more number of bit-flips. If the entire last layer is secured, we require 6×more number
of bit-flips.
Defense Strategy 3. We conclude that securing critical weights or even all weights
of last layer helps improve the resistance to T-BFA, but cannot completely defend it.
T-BFA could find an alternative path of attack, but with a higher number of bit-flips.
7 Conclusion
We propose three targeted adversarial weight attack schemes, i.e. N-to-1, 1-to-1 and 1-
to-1(stealthy), that severely degrade the classification performance of quantized DNNs.
Our T-BFA is based on a novel iterative class-dependant bit ranking algorithm. We
demonstrate that a compact network is more vulnerable to a N-to-1 attack while a
larger network is more susceptible to the stealthy version of T-BFA. Finally, we provide
possible defense strategies to make DNNs more resilient to such aggressive adversarial
weight noise attacks.
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